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In his recent defence of politics in this
journal,1 Mathew Flinders argued that
‘people ‘hate politics’ because they sim-
ply do not understand it; and they are
generally not helped to understand it by
the media (or university professors of
politics for that matter)’. Here, I want to
explore academic misconceptions of pol-
itics, with a special though not exclusive
focus on the discipline of political the-
ory/ political science. I then want to out-
line, in counterpoint, three features of
public life whose consequences, I sug-
gest, vitiate the practical implications of
much well-intentioned analysis and
advocacy from the university world. I
do not claim originality; much of what I
argue is synthesised from a diversity of
academic dissidents, who have in com-
mon an interest in the theory of politics
(in contrast to a good deal of political
science and most of political theory).
Politics: the view from the
academy
Large portions of research and scholar-
ship ground their enterprise at least in
part on its potential to contribute directly
or indirectly to the making of public
policy. Yet to the extent that this work
does not come to terms with the role of
elected officials in policy making, any
pragmatic justification will be heavily
mortgaged, and the enterprise will pro-
ceed in the shadow of that liability. This
section examines three important tradi-
tions which purport in part to address the
improvement of policy making. Each of
them constitutes a large school of
thought, with journals, associations and
meetings, earmarked professorial
appointments, dozens of books and
papers published per year, and the rest
of the apparatus which marks scholarly
lettres de noblesse. Manifestly, they consti-
tute stimulating and rewarding forms of
intellectual activity. Furthermore, they
have, to varying degrees, attracted the
interest and support of officials. The
argument is not that these traditions are
somehow unworthy of the recognition
they have achieved; rather it is that they
carry with them a partial, shallow and
etiolated vision of politics, and that this
compromises their potential contribution
to the improvement of public life.
The first tradition in question assumes
that important improvements in policy
making would ensue if only policy
makers would attend to the knowledge
which researchers of all sorts produce
and possess. The latest formal version of
this large, variegated and irrepressible
school of thought is the evidence-based
policy movement, but it is so well-
entrenched in the socialisation associated
with doctoral education that it exists in
varying forms in every empirically
oriented discipline and research labora-
tory. The idea is that policy addresses
states of the world and that empirical
research identifies causal relationships
which can alter states of the world. The
former should obviously benefit from the
latter, but fails more often than not to do
so. The reason for this failure is ‘politics’. I
shall call this tradition, in lieu of some
more recondite term, ‘policy science’
because it assumes that what meets the
epistemological standards of the various
empirical disciplines merits privileged
status in policy making.
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A second tradition assumes that policy
makers need guidance as to the ethical
status of various policies, typically as
measured against some single overriding
value such as justice, virtue or liberty. The
substance of policy can be weighed
against the standards established by a
series of deductions from that ethical
guidepost, and this chain of logic should
define a regulative ideal for policy
makers: politics is applied ethics, or ‘the
priority of the moral over the political’ as
Bernard Williams put it.2 This tradition
constitutes the mainstream of Anglo-
American political theory, known vari-
ously as ‘normative political theory’,
‘deontological political theory’, ‘meta-
ethical foundationalism’, ‘political moral-
ism’, ‘transcendental justice’, ‘liberal
idealism’, ‘liberal moralism’ or ‘deontolo-
gical absolutism’. I shall call this tradition
‘ethical primacy’ because it assumes that
explicit ethical reasoning must play a
central role in policy making. A problem
is that this form of political theory lacks a
theory of politics—that is, it is silent as to
how its conclusions might conceivably be
enacted in a democratic polity
A third tradition grew from critiques
of the previous two. The mini-public
school of deliberative democracy seeks
to derive legitimate policy through the
assembly and education of representa-
tive samples of the citizenry. The result-
ing recommendations are claimed to be
compelling for their fellows because of
this representative feature. Summarising
the claims in the literature, Rosenberg
reports that ‘participation in deliberation
leads individuals to reflect and interact
in a way that is more logical, rational,
just, considerate of others, self-critical
and oriented to the common good’3
leading to decisions which Warren
affirms ‘are likely to be more legitimate,
more reasonable, more informed, more
effective, and more politically viable.’4
Contra its advocates, I shall call this
tradition ‘deliberative discipline’ because
its key feature is not—as claimed—the
representativeness of citizens recruited
to deliberate on policy, but rather the
discipline provided by the ‘neutral
expert’ (normally an academic) who ani-
mates the deliberation. Here I claim only
that the restrictions on the nature of the
debate—insistence upon public reasons,
sanctions on emotion and rhetoric, the
banning of party, prohibition of argu-
ments based on interest, religious faith
or illiberal ideology—admit but a frac-
tion of democratic political discussion as
commonly understood.
All of these traditions slight policy
making in electoral democracies—that is
to say, in the only democracies we know
about. Contemporary politics, they claim,
is uninformed, unreflective, impulsive,
personality-driven and myopic, leaving
citizens vulnerable to demagogy and
deception. This can obviously be so, but
as Steinberger notes, ‘political judgment
is, at one and the same time . . . the
ineluctable source of pathological poli-
tics’ and ‘the unique solution to’ such
politics.5
To the extent that politics in every
democracy involves a continuous strug-
gle for power among competing politi-
cians and parties, these traditions are anti-
political. They deny the autonomy of politics,
and the agency inherent in representative
democracy, by trying to discipline citizens
and politicians.
To the extent that they want to base
politics on public reason, in which poli-
cies are to be judged against an explicitly
logical, transparent version of some pub-
lic interest, they reconstruct politics as a
quest for truth and substitute academic for
civic judgment.
To the extent that they want to ground
policy making exclusively in evidence
and/or values, they misconceive policy
making as a search for means to achieve
predetermined ends, when in fact it is a
dialectical process of identifying and re-
conciling ends in light of the means
which may turn out to be available and
acceptable.
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To the extent that they wish to purge
politics of passion, power, ideology and
interest, and imagine policy making as an
idealised set-piece reflection on facts and
values, they indulge in an heroic and uto-
pian denial of human character and motiva-
tion, and wish away the contingency,
complexity and contention inherent in public
life.
To the extent that they treat citizens
and politicians as so many anonymous
students whose logic and knowledge is to
be graded, or as interchangeable bearers
of no more than those characteristics
tractable by demography, they abrogate
the critical role of personality and particular-
istic ties in the multifold local milieux of
electoral democracy.
To the extent that they imagine policy
making in terms of a single mind tackling
a single problem in its entirety, they fail to
understand the collective, disjointed and
sequential nature of most policy making.
To the extent that they prioritise the
justification of substantive policy in terms
of transparent impersonal standards and
ignore the persuasion of citizens and
politicians by one another, they are anti-
rhetorical, severing logos from ethos and
pathos.6
There is, of course, nothing objection-
able about wishing to reform government
and politics. We need ideals to inspire us,
knowledge to guide us and venues to
express ourselves and listen to our fellow
citizens. The traditions in question begin
by grading our performance in these
regards as a substantial failure against
their standards. Policy scientists are
puzzled at their sustained inability to
have a greater influence and deplore
continuing poor performance by policy
makers. Ethical theorists have little to say
about how we might get from here to
there, preferring to further refine their
standards. Advocates of deliberative dis-
cipline, for their part, want to stop the
music insofar as feasible, and rewrite the
tune themselves, far from the madding
crowds of politics and the media.
With respect to these sorts of theory,
Galston expresses doubts:
The difficulty arises, I believe, in determining
when the deviation from the world as we
know it becomes so significant—quan-
titatively or qualitatively—that it becomes
the political theory equivalent of science fic-
tion—an act of imagination that may illumin-
ate what is distinctive about the world we
actually inhabit but that offers no guidance
about how we should function in that world.
A theory of justice for a parallel world has no
necessary application to our world.7
Not the immaculate conception
of policy
The cardinal facts of public life are ex-
treme degrees of competition, publicity and
uncertainty. The imprint of these on the
elected makes their life and work radic-
ally different from those of the vast
majority of citizens. Perhaps only profes-
sional athletes and show business celeb-
rities, and possibly a handful of corporate
executives, can potentially empathise
with the life of the politician. Yet even
they function within a substantially more
explicit and predictable set of expecta-
tions than do politicians.
Stepping forward to represent one’s
fellow citizens constitutes a claim to
understand and serve their best inter-
ests—the good of society. This claim
must be vindicated and re-vindicated
under the eyes and subject to the changing
interpretations of all, as filtered by the
vagaries of media coverage, until such
time as representation ceases. It must be
sustained, especially and above all, in the
face of a stream of events which are
entirely unpredictable and intractable,
and which press the ‘good of society’
into unceasing metamorphosis. Finally, it
must be tested against the claims of others
who indefatigably seek one’s place. The
existential reality of politics is not power,
it is the ever-present prospect, under the
vicissitudes of competition, publicity and
uncertainty, of its loss.
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There isnomanual, thereareno rules, as
to political performance. Success in non-
political life turns out to be at best an
indifferent predictor of success in politics.
Theopeningof possibility constitutedby a
political career can engender enormous
creativity or tremendous disappointment,
and often, both. The skills which serve a
politician well in one circumstance may
not necessarily serve them as well in
another. Political judgement—political
life—is entirely context-dependent. One
size does not fit all. Pace the rationalist
academy, the key differentiator among
politicians is not respect for knowledge,
or ethical lucidity, or a commitment to
disciplined dialogue—although all can
be valuable. It is the capacity to adapt
more rapidly than one’s peers.
Competition is built into the very
essence of representative democracy.
Even Athenian democracy, built upon
random selection rather than election,
was rife with competition. Politics is
about people before it is about ideas, or
policy, or constitutional framework. The
reality of public life is that others want
your part in it, and that you perform
before an endlessly critical audience.
This engenders continuing insecurity
about the protection of one’s intangible
asset: political capital. As R. A. B. Butler
once said of Parliamentary Question
Time: ‘It’s like the jungle. If they see you
limping, they are after you.’8
As a consequence of competition, poli-
ticians are continuously coping with the
dilemma of treating people asmeans or as
ends, or of being treated as one or the
other. Alliances, feuds, threats, compacts
and settlements big and small are thedaily
bread of politics. In this world, the cur-
rency of information is farmore important
than its epistemic status, and gossip is an
essential part of the working day. Accord-
ing to another British minister: ‘You
develop a certain sort of intuition about
things, about people’s relationships and
soon . . . this gives you the subtleties . . . the
autumn tints rather than the blacks and
whites. And this is really what the life
here’s largely about.’9
Publicity
The first reflex of the politician is to im-
agine the media treatment of and public
reaction to any act, expression or policy
announcement, not because he or she is
necessarily a craven publicity seeker or
feckless demagogue, but because the gen-
ius of democracy is precisely to induce a
consciousness of public opinion, an
attempt to think representatively. That
this exercise seems too often unsatisfac-
tory to many of those who have never
borne the onus in question in their own
working lives does not make it dispensa-
ble for those who do. Neither the events
of the day salient to political judgement,
nor the media construction thereof, are
likely to be consistently influenced by the
initiatives of politicians, who struggle
constantly and mostly in vain to control
much of what matters to civic judgements
about them.
Richard Crossman expressed it this way
when he was Minister of Housing and
Local Government:
I am riding high—too high for comfort. It’s an
alarming thing how public opinion suddenly
switches from saying, ‘That Crossman! He’s
an impossible, erratic fellow. He won’t last
long’ to calling me a brilliant success. . . .
There are a tremendous number of unpredict-
able factors which could knock me right off
my horse as rapidly as I have been elevated to
it by Fleet Street, Westminster and White-
hall.10
Or take Churchill on his political pro-
spects in 1942: ‘I am like a bomber pilot.
. . . I go out night after night, and I know
that one night I shall not return.’11
The daily preoccupation of public life,
then, is the accumulation and husband-
ing of a fugitive political capital.12 To the
extent it is a search for substantive solu-
tions to public problems, or fair terms of
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cooperation, or justice, or disciplined dia-
logue, it is usually, though not inevitably,
insofar as these contribute to the intangi-
ble capital of the political actor. This is not
a cynical verdict on the moral or intellec-
tual qualities of politicians; this is an
observation about the foundational
incentives of electoral democracy. With-
out political capital, political agents can-
not implement solutions to public
problems, cannot effectively advocate
fair terms of cooperation, cannot pursue
justice, cannot be worthwhile interlocu-
tors in public dialogue.
Policy scientists, ethical theorists and
deliberative disciplinarians want public
debate to consist of arguments based—at
a minimum—on evidence and principle.
Politicians instinctively understand that
control of the public agenda depends not
on achieving the kinds of standards
which reign in classrooms, tenure com-
mittees and the editorial boards of
learned journals, but rather in being
seen and heard, ideally in the construc-
tion of meaning and the incarnation of
authenticity rather than in a claim to
truth. For them, it is more important to
induce trust and belief than to try to
educate citizens on the facts and prin-
ciples. The intervention of the media
between the politician and the citizen,
and the political diversity of citizens,
will always leave the politician’s project
more or less unfulfilled, to be endlessly
renewed.
In this kind of public arena, it is not
principally precision (logos), but convic-
tion (pathos and ethos, emotion and char-
acter) that are being sought. In contrast to
the expository style taught to generations
of undergraduates, analogy, narrative,
ambiguity, ridicule and obloquy, and a
measure of hypocrisy, are likely to dom-
inate political discourse. In a complex,
rapidly evolving and demanding world,
it is instrumentally rational for politicians
to seek commitment rather than consen-
sus, and it is prudentially rational for
citizens to assess character and per-
sonality as well as, and often rather
than, policy.
Uncertainty
Politicians would be delighted if research
or ethics or citizen deliberation could
stem the uncertainty of policy making.
Sometimes they can. No one would like
to jettison science in the service of regula-
tion of pharmaceutical products or pesti-
cides, for example, or principled analysis
of human rights or legal doctrines. But
even in these cases, what the average
politician will retain is the high level of
controversy that remains after the aca-
demics and researchers have done their
jobs, controversy often arising from the
work of other academics and researchers.
Politicians know that problems as con-
strued by researchers will look very dif-
ferent when and if they become issues on
the public agenda. The primary clients for
research—granting bodies, foundations,
editorial boards, corporate interests—
each have distinctive standards of evalu-
ation which cannot anticipate history.
The advancement of the discipline, the
promotion of a certain type of reform, the
domination of a market segment by inno-
vation, often have no common measure
with the construction of a political chal-
lenge eventually thrust before ministers.
Politicians know that policy and poli-
tics are the domain par excellence of
unintended and unanticipated conse-
quences. They grasp implicitly what
researchers tend to ignore: that the rigor-
ously demonstrated cause and effect rela-
tionships are usually far distant from the
messy problems on the public agenda,
and that today’s knowledge may well be
discarded tomorrow. They know that, in
any case, implementation takes so long
and is so uncertain that the downstream
substantive consequences of policy may
most often be considered by the proxi-
mate policy maker as a matter for credit
or blame for successors, not for him or
her. For him or her, what matters is the
536 Richard French
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3 # The Author 2012. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2012
reception of the intention rather than the
evaluation of the execution. (Here lies a
good part of the tension between elected
and permanent officials.)
Despite the impression that opinion
surveys solve politicians’ information
problem with respect to constituent pref-
erences, leaving only the matter of how
best to indulge them, the more common
experience for politicians is to be unsure
exactly what constituent preferences on a
given issue really are—mostly because
citizens themselves are disinterested,
uninformed or uncertain. As Ehrenhalt
put it after a lengthy examination of
American political folkways: ‘[I]n the
end there is only so much that the electo-
rate can tell us. Most of the time it is not
trying to send any message.’13
The traditions examined earlier want a
politics of clarity and logic, in which per-
suasion, to the extent it is tolerated,
should serve the creation of consensus
and abjure ‘mixed message politics’;
they imagine that ensuing democratic
mandates would induce deference to a
victorious party of principle. Politicians
know that if all the supporters of a meas-
ure had to agree on one and the same
rationale for that measure, politics would
stop dead in its tracks and policy making
would prove impossible. The fabrication
of coalitions is at the very heart of demo-
cratic politics and it is not a matter for
policy scientists, far less for the advocates
of ethical primacy. Politicians recount the
moments when a measure A appealed to
constituency  because A ! x and to
constituency 	 because A ! y, where x
and y are incompatible outcomes.
We would like to imagine that public
policy decisions are consequent upon a
well-prepared meeting of the political
executive: men and women seated
around a conference table, informed by
a careful reading of the briefing docu-
ments, benefitting from the advice of
experts speaking truth to power in muted
tones, with the Prime Minister or Presi-
dent managing a fair and open discussion
in which each cabinet member present
has his or her say. After the appropriate
discussion, a decision which reflects the
balance of reasons evoked is specified,
and the might of constitutional authority
is conferred upon a set of measures to
address the public interest. This, at least,
is the ideal. Alas, it bears little relation-
ship to reality. We know, for example,
that there was no such meeting before the
George W. Bush administration decided
to invade Iraq.
Life for senior politicians is a stimulat-
ing, enervating and exhausting blur of
appointments, questions, airplanes,
meetings, negotiations, limousines, brief-
ings, hotel rooms, debates in the legisla-
ture, church basements, phone calls,
decisions, community centres, speeches,
boardrooms, interviews, more questions,
appearances and controversies. A senior
politician wakes up in the morning like a
rugby or American football player wait-
ing under a long high kick; eventually he
catches the ball (or drops it), the stadium
roars, and the bodies start to fly. He or she
is at once the focus of attention and the
object of the actions of many others seen
and unseen. (It was to do this that all the
canvassing, fundraising, committee ser-
vice, civic and political activism, net-
working, plotting and planning were
devoted.) It is extraordinarily exhilarat-
ing; former politicians say there is noth-
ing to compare with it. It also absorbs the
totality of the energy and imagination of
any typical human being for as long as it
lasts. When it ends, there is relief, but
there is often also enormous chagrin, a
sense of loss and of inconsequence, a
burning desire to return to the centre of
things.
The challenge is to organise such per-
sons regularly to undertake collective
decisions having important consequences
for large numbers of their fellow citizens.
The aforementioned ideal description of a
cabinet meeting fails to include the gen-
eral lack of preparation of members, their
constant arriving and leaving, the short-
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age of time, the phone calls, the reading
and writing of messages, the fatigue and
drowsiness, the effects of alcohol and
food, the diversions onto the terrain of
current crises and tactics, the political
preferences of the chairman and her
secretariat which drafts the minutes and
the decisions, the relative political capital
of the various protagonists—in short, the
fact that policy making is deeply
embedded in the ongoing drama of polit-
ical life. Notwithstanding the efforts of
central officials over the last century, it
can rarely claim any separate or privil-
eged status.
And this is only in matter of the formal
machinery for policy making. Much more
policy than often appreciated is in fact
made not under the express mandates of
specific cabinet members or within the
formal machinery, but on the run by
those whose political capital means they
can make policy and whose public dicta
and actions condemn the formal machin-
ery to approval after the fact, or as in the
case of the invasion of Iraq—not at all.
This may be intentional or inadvertent,
but it is common.
Furthermore, the structure of power in
the post-industrial democracies, the role
of the courts, and the impact of globalisa-
tion and of multilevel governance mean
that any given government will more
often than not inherit only a fragment of
a policy problem at a stage in its lengthy
‘resolution’; the degrees of freedom ima-
gined by a second-order reconstruction of
the issue are usually a vast overestima-
tion of those open to any given political
actor at any given time and place. Out-
comes are often determined by a series of
decisions over a period of years by any
number of authorities (and by contem-
poraneous events), and end up represent-
ing the preferences of none of them.
Conclusion
Academics want politicians to think as
(they would like to think) they and their
colleagues do. Deliberative disciplinar-
ians in particular want politicians to en-
courage citizens to think for themselves
. . . under the discipline of academic
norms, informed by ‘impartial’ experts.
Professors do not want to concede their
distinctive disciplinary standards in
favour of any expertise which political
aptitude and experience might confer.
The demands of politics are unpredic-
tably diverse and protean and thus polit-
ical reason is unusually resistant to
generalisation and codification; it
remains tacit and only obtusely articul-
able even for those who possess it. To
some significant extent, the ability to
deploy it effectively must be the product
of nature and of the accidents and vicissi-
tudes of life, rather than of any more
intentional preparation.
Limitations of time, information, and
analytical capacity require fast and frugal
forms of rationality which sacrifice any
pretence to optimisation. The ability to
use these forms of rationality in a given
domain distinguishes neophytes and
journeymen from experts. Experts per-
ceive and select information from the
environment more efficiently and faster
than others; they recognise patterns or
similarities from situation to situation;
they resort to conscious analysis only
rarely; they perceive problems and
courses of action as parts of a single
intuition. It takes unique gifts to adapt
this form of expertise successfully over
time to the inexhaustible variety of
‘wicked’ ‘messy’ problems which public
life unfailingly presents to politicians,
under the constant pressure of publicity
and competition.
Politics is a never-ending theatre—as
Ronald Reagan said: ‘Politics is just like
show business’14—in which the character,
authenticity, creativity, integrity and con-
sistency, self-possession and rhetoric of
the politician are continuously tested.
Gross errors of fact may be penalised,
but—outside the Treasury/Finance port-
folio—failures to master professional or
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disciplinary knowledge generally are not.
Politics must be staged rather than lec-
tured.
The flaw in these academic traditions is
the failure to understand the ‘presenta-
tional’ part of representation and the
consequential devaluation of the ‘rhet-
orical moment’ as the essence of demo-
cratic politics.15 The rhetorical moment
has the potential to create meaning and
trust, whereas official committees or citi-
zens’ assemblies merely make imperso-
nal recommendations, and find
themselves inevitably at the disposal of
the political executive. Rhetoric can
amount to mere manipulation, but to
leave it at that is a mistake. If democratic
leadership exists, it also passes through
the rhetorical moment.
For Rosanvallon, ‘political will . . . has
always needed to be staged. . . . Decisions
have to be made theatrical in order for
them to be converted into meaningful
and effective acts.’16 Lyndon Johnson ‘fig-
ured . . . that a new piece of legislation
had to be ‘‘performed’’ for the mass
media so as to give that piece of legisla-
tion a fair chance of being successful’.17
These performances have a dual charac-
ter. They constitute an attempt to set the
terms of partisan engagement by control-
ling the vocabulary and conceptual
framework of debate. They also consti-
tute an attempt to make the collective
efforts of citizens meaningful, to maintain
a semblance of political community, to
inspire a sense of mutual support, if not
obligation, among citizens, and crucially,
in doing so their protagonists assume the
ever-present risk of very public failure.
It is idle to wish away these constitu-
tive features of political life, particularly
since they are not simply reflections of the
personal flaws of the political class but
characteristics inherent in democratic life
for both good and ill. Academics who are
uncomfortable with the idea that a small
fraction of the population temporarily
rules the great majority may wish to con-
struct alternatives; to the extent the effort
depends on public reason—the apolitical
ideal in which reason trumps interests,
elides comprehensive doctrines, prohi-
bits partisanry and suppresses emo-
tions—it asks too much, not only of
politicians, but of all of us, certainly
including the professoriate.
However unattractive at times, politics
does not select for the intellectually and
ethically handicapped; politicians reflect
as they represent the citizens from which
they issue and among whom they return.
In the interim, it is their particular charge
to embody the collective aspirations and
to respond to the needs of their fellows. It
is a tragic challenge, guaranteed to dis-
appoint, but in its absence we would face
no more than the choice of a Hobbesian
struggle or a rationalist utopia with
science or philosophy as singular qualifi-
cation for the role of Platonic guardian-
ship.
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